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Abstract
Objective: To estimate the relationship between a hospital data breach and hospital quality
outcome
Materials and Methods: Hospital data breaches reported to the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services breach portal and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse database were
merged with the Medicare Hospital Compare data to assemble a panel of non-federal acute-
care inpatient hospitals for years 2011 to 2015. The study panel included 2,619 hospitals.
Changes in 30-day AMI mortality rate following a hospital data breach were estimated using
a multivariate regression model based on a difference-in-differences approach.
Results: A data breach was associated with a 0.338[95% CI, 0.101-0.576] percentage point
increase in the 30-day AMI mortality rate in the year following the breach and a 0.446[95% CI,
0.164-0.729] percentage point increase two years after the breach. For comparison, the median
30-day AMI mortality rate has been decreasing about 0.4 percentage points annually since
2011 due to progress in care. The magnitude of the breach impact on hospitals’ AMI mortality
rates was comparable to a year’s worth historical progress in reducing AMI mortality rates.
Conclusion: Hospital data breaches significantly increased the 30-day mortality rate for AMI.
Data breaches may disrupt the processes of care that rely on health information technology.
Financial costs to repair a breach may also divert resources away from patient care. Thus
breached hospitals should carefully focus investments in security procedures, processes, and
health information technology that jointly lead to better data security and improved patient
outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Health data breaches in recent years have raised serious concerns about the security of
protected health information. Wide adoption of electronic health record systems (EHRs)
following the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)
Act of 2009 has digitized vast stores of patient data, increasing the possibility of large-scale
hacks and inadvertent losses. Demand for health data in the black market makes hospitals a
lucrative target for external attackers.[1,2] Internal vulnerabilities in hospital information
systems may be exploited by the external attackers or insiders who may inappropriately
disclose data. Health data breaches include loss, theft, unauthorized access, and hacking
incidents, which may be associated with error or negligence by hospital staff handling the data.
Hospitals reported 264 data breaches between 2011 and 2015, exposing personal information
of 5,856,093 individuals (counts based on HHS data analyzed by authors).
Breaches arise from many different sources, but regardless of the source the resulting discovery
and mitigation of a breach can be viewed as a random shock to a hospital’s care-delivery
system. While agents affiliated with a hospital may benefit from intentionally leaking
information (e.g. hospital staff selling patient data to a third party for personal gains), agents
(and the hospital itself) face criminal indictment, fines, and business losses from intentional
or negligent breaches,[3] which disincentivize intentional breaches. Thus a hospital data
breach can be framed as a natural experiment to estimate the impact of a breach on patient
outcomes.
Hospital data breaches provide a unique opportunity to study how information problems
affect patient outcomes. Subsequent to a breach, organizations typically take action to
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mitigate the failure and improve security. Such actions can be far ranging, from adopting
new policies and procedures to installing new security technologies. Taking advantage of
financial incentives provided by of HITECH, many hospitals have made investments in more
secure health information technology (HIT), replacing or enhancing modules of their EHRs.
New systems often support security features such as stronger authentication procedures and
time-outs for inactivity. Data handling policies typically change as well to control which
users have the privilege to see particular patients or specific data fields. All of these actions
require hospital staff to acclimate to new systems, learn new procedures, and adjust to new
ways of obtaining and manipulating patient data.
In extreme cases, hospital data breaches can also negatively affect the accuracy and timeliness
of patient information available to providers. A hacking incident may temporarily disrupt
hospital’s servers, making patient data unavailable to providers while the servers are being
fixed. Severe hacking attacks may force hospitals to revert to paper charts.[4,5]. Instances of
unauthorized access suggests that the systems in place may have weaknesses in verifying the
identity of the provider or the patient, which may increase the risk of a provider inadvertently
accessing or editing the wrong patient’s information. Inaccuracies or delays in patient
information are likely to disrupt the care process and adversely affect patient outcomes.
Information problems can ripple through the continuum of care when a patient is transferred
from one provider to another, in a handoff.[6] The literature on discontinuity of care has
documented the association between miscommunication during handoffs and adverse patient
events.[7–9] A hospital data breach and subsequent mitigation activities may disrupt the
information flow or the processes involved in handoffs, therefore leading to adverse patient
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outcomes.
Furthermore, efforts to fix the damages from a data breach may divert resources and attention
away from initiatives focused on patient care, like improved patient safety or medication
adherence. Breached hospitals incur significant costs associated with investigating and fixing
the breach. The Ponemon Institute estimated that in 2016 the health care industry spent an
average of $355 per stolen record for direct and indirect costs associated with a breach.[10]
Breach costs vary depending on the size and type of the breach. Large breaches place a
larger financial burden on the organization. Typical data breaches of 500 patients cost
hospitals about $200,000 on average, including costs from investigating the breach, notifying
the affected individuals, public relations, credit monitoring, litigation, and fines.[11] Large
breaches cost much more – an analysis of press releases by the HHS since 2008 documented 40
settled cases with the median settlement amount of $857,750 for the fine alone.[12] The aim
of our paper is to estimate the impact of a data breach on the 30-day mortality rate using
a difference-in-differences approach to analyze a panel of non-federal acute-care inpatient
hospitals from 2011-2015. We hypothesized that remedial activities following a breach may
delay and disrupt the patient care. There may be an initial breach effect: hacking incidents
can shutdown IT systems and disrupt care, which we see in ransomware attacks, but these
were rare before to 2016. Theft, unauthorized access by insiders, lost devices are unlikely to
have a direct effect. However, new access and authentication procedures, new protocols, new
software after any breach incident is likely to disrupt clinicians.
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2 Background
2.1 Breach Regulation
As part of the HITECH Act, health care providers, health plans, and other entities covered
by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to are required
to notify the affected individuals, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
and sometimes the media following a breach of unsecured protected health information.[13]
HHS maintains a public database of the reported breaches affecting 500 or more individuals,
submitted from October 2009 to the present.[14]
HHS defines a data breach as impermissible use or disclosure of protected health informa-
tion.[13] HHS classifies data breaches into the following categories: theft, loss, unauthorized
access/disclosure, improper disposal, hacking/IT incident, and unknown/other. A specific
definition of each category is not given on the HHS website and questions can be raised
whether these categories can be conceptually isolated and subjectively defined. The boundary
between theft and loss may be unclear when a laptop goes missing. In a hospital, monitoring
and enforcing which provider is authorized to access which patient information at what time
is not a trivial task. Peeking is a widespread problem, which if detected is now considered
a breach. Hacking is a broad term for computer intrusion by an outside party and it can
be done by various techniques. To add to the complexity, these categories are not mutually
exclusive as a breach event involves a combination of these categories. Consequently, the
number of individuals affected by the breach is often an estimate and precise numbers should
be viewed with skepticism. An individual may be double counted if affected by a hacking
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incident that attacks multiple systems.
Collections of reported breaches, like those on the HHS website and Privacy Rights Clearing-
house, do not represent all breaches. To end up on these public databases, a breach must be
(1) detected by the entity and (2) disclosed in some way. As defined by HHS, breaches must
be publicly reported if they affect 500 or more individuals. However, HHS allows exemptions
if the breached data satisfy the HIPAA safe harbor method for encryption.[15] The Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse reports breaches of any size disclosed by the organization or the media.
3 Methods
3.1 Data
Our analysis included breaches reported to the HHS and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
(PRC) database between 2011 and 2015. Similar to the HHS database, the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse (PRC) aggregates reported breaches from public sources including the media,
blogs, and government.[16] Both data sources provide information on the name of the breached
entity, when the breach report was filed, location of the breached entity, type of breached
entity, type of breach, and specific comments regarding the breach. The databases only
provide the name of the breached entity; they do not provide standardized identifiers to
facilitate linkages with other data. To overcome these limitations, observations in the breach
databases were linked by hospital name and state, however the potential for erroneous matches
remains.
Breaches were more frequently reported from states with larger populations. Due to state
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variations in breach notification laws and how they are enforced, some states may be over
represented. Before HITECH, California was one of the first states to enact a breach
notification law, which became effective on July 1, 2003, and most states have followed its
language.[17] Yet as of January 4, 2016, Alabama, New Mexico, and South Dakota do not
have a breach notification law.[18]
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) provide public use data on Medicare-
certified hospitals. Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS) provides data on
hospital characteristics and financial variables.[19] Medicare Hospital Compare provides data
on hospital quality measures.[20] Data on hospital breaches from HHS and PRC databases
were merged with HCRIS and Hospital Compare data for years 2011-2015.
The raw data panel consisted of 6,435 hospitals with 30,384 hospital-year observations. Data
were restricted to non-federal acute-care inpatient hospitals. Hospitals in the U.S territories
and Maryland (which has a prospective payment system waiver) were excluded for consistency.
To maintain consistency in the financial data, the data were further restricted to hospitals
that filed HCRIS with between 360 and 370 reporting days. When a hospital submitted
multiple reports in a given year, the most recent report was used. The restrictions yielded
3,369 acute-care hospitals with 15,517 observations. Finally, observations with missing values
in the dependent or independent variables were dropped from analysis. 3,932 observations
were missing the 30-day AMI mortality rate, accounting for most of the missing values. The
final study panel consisted of 2,619 hospitals with 11,568 hospital-year observations.
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3.2 Generalized Difference in Difference Model
The association between breaches and hospital outcomes was estimated using a generalized
difference-in-differences (DID) framework with multiple pre- and post- periods.[21] Data
breaches represent random shocks reported in a specific year, though susceptible to measure-
ment error from the actual year of breach. Panel data provide pre- and post-breach measures
of patient outcomes. The DID strategy controls for time trends in outcomes among the
breached hospitals, assuming that the breached hospitals would have followed the same trend
if they had not been breached, to isolate the change in outcomes associated with the breach.
Yit = αi + yeart + βXit +
−2∑
n=−4
pinDi(t− T ∗i = n)it +
4∑
n=0
τnDi(t− T ∗i = n)it + it
The DID model was specified as the following equation. For hospital i at time t=2011. . . 2015,
Y is the 30-day mortality rate (%) in Medicare Hospital Compare,[22] adjusted for patient
characteristics to allow comparisons between hospitals. The risk adjusted mortality rates
are model based estimates and they have uncertainty around them, which we ignore in our
analysis. The mortality rates are based on a 36-month moving average, starting from the
current year and moving back 36 months; hence a lagged response to a breach is expected.
This is a limitation set by the data provider. Hospital Compare data reports mortality and
readmission rates for AMI, heart failure, and pneumonia.
AMI, pneumonia, and heart failure are common conditions. Past studies have found that
the adoption of health IT has been associated with improvement in some of the quality
measures for these conditions. For example, health IT adoption was found to reduce the
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60-day mortality for pneumonia and congestive heart failure.[23] Thus, such improvements in
pneumonia and heart failure outcomes associated with newly adopted HIT may offset the
negative impact of a data breach. AMI is an acute condition that requires timely treatment
using accepted guidelines, thus clinicians treating AMI patients may see less benefit from
improvements in HIT. If adopting HIT offers little improvement to AMI mortality, such null
relationship helps our estimates to isolate the negative impact of a data breach on AMI
mortality due to subsequent changes in HIT and patient care processes. We conjectured
that AMI mortality would be the most sensitive to data breach among the three conditions.
Preliminary analysis showed that breaches were correlated with the AMI mortality rate.
AMI is an acute event, in which a hospitalized patient’s outcome depends on the quality of
inpatient care.[24] Also, acute medical events are less prone to selection bias due to patient
choice, which reduces the possibility of patients avoiding service at a hospital known to have
poor quality or one that had been breached. Hospital data breaches were associated with
lower number of outpatient visits and admissions in the long-run, which suggests that patients
may avoid hospitals involved in a data breach[25]. Thus we chose AMI as our focus for the
DID analysis.
Di is a treatment dummy, which is set to 1 if hospital was breached. If a hospital was
breached in multiple years, only the first year was coded as breached and the subsequent years
were coded as not breached. Thirty eight of the 2,619 hospitals were breached in multiple
years. This specification assumes that a breach is a one-time event, which is true for most
but not all hospitals in the data. For simplicity, this specification ignores multiple breaches,
which may be correlated with the severity of the information problem.
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(t− T ∗i = n) are time-to-event dummies, which are set to 1 when the year of observation t is
n = −4,−3,−2, 0, ...4 years away relative to the hospital specific time of breach T ∗i . n = 0
is the year of the breach. The year before breach n = −1 was set as the omitted category.
The effect of the breach n years after the event is captured by the coefficient τn on the
interaction of the treatment dummy with the time-to-event dummies. A simpler model that
only estimates a single event dummy raises the concern of how to specify the not-breached
years. Categorizing all of the periods before and after a breach year into a single not-breached
category is an oversimplification when rich panel data is available. Categorizing the time
periods into a dichotomous pre and post breach is problematic because the impact of a breach
is unlikely to be permanent. A set of time-to-event dummies can flexibly capture how the
breach impact varied over time.
Setting n = −1 as the omitted category has the advantage of larger observations in that
category because there are fewer observations at the far ends of the relative time. For example,
only the hospitals breached at 2015 have an observation at -4. Hence the point estimates
at the far ends are imprecise due to smaller sample size, and using them as the reference
category will make it harder to detect significant differences.
We modified the specification from Jacobson et al[21] because our treatment-event-time is
different for every hospital. Also, observations in the control group do not have a time-to-event
dummy; instead they were coded as a time-invariant “never breached” dummy, which was
omitted from the fixed effects estimation. This specification is equivalent to combining the
never-breached observations with the omitted n = −1 category instead of giving them their
own dummy.
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Coefficient pin tests the pre-breach trend between the breached hospitals and the never
breached hospitals. Prior to the event, the breached hospitals and the control hospital are
expected to have parallel trends thus pin should not significantly diverge from 0. We assumed
the effect of a breach (at n years since the event) is the same regardless of what year the
breach occurred.
αi is the hospital fixed effects. yeart is the year fixed effects. An organization’s safety culture
captures the knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes regarding safety in the organization.[26] Safety
and security are rooted in cultures that emphasize the importance of well-designed processes
and heightened awareness of goals. We suggest that patient safety and data security cultures
are closely related. The overall hospital safety climate, influenced by organizational policy
regarding safety, has been associated with readmissions for AMI and heart failure.[24,27]
Hospital fixed effects control for the unobserved time-invariant hospital safety culture.
The DID models was estimated using a fixed effects regression where the hospital effect
is removed using the within transformation. The within transformation also removes the
time-invariant regressors, such as the treatment dummy D, and they cannot be separately
identified.
Xit are the time varying hospital characteristics, including operating revenue, number of beds,
length of stay, bed occupancy rate, meaningful use status (meaningful user of electronic health
records defined in HITECH), patient satisfaction, and patient safety indicators. Patient
satisfaction measures included the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers
and Systems (HCAHPS) survey items from the Medicare compare data.[28]
Hospital data breaches may be correlated with underlying care quality problems that have
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negative implications for patient outcomes. Provider error or negligence in securing patient
data may be associated with the error or negligence in providing care. Hospitals with poor
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) patient safety indicators have been
associated with higher readmission rates and mortality.[29,30] A subset of hospitals reported
the AHRQ patient safety indicators PSI-4,6,12,15,90, which were used as control variables in
robustness tests. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and allow for within hospital
correlation.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
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Figure 1: Year vs mean 30-day AMI mortality rate
Figure 1 shows that the 30-day AMI mortality rate has been decreasing, for all hospital-year
observations. The mean 30-day AMI mortality rate decreased from 15.76% in 2011 to 14.16%
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in 2015, showing steady improved treatment for AMI.
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Figure 2: Relative time from breach(n=0) vs mean 30-day AMI mortality rate for the subset
of hospitals that had been breached
Figure 2 shows the 30-day AMI mortality rate over the time from breach, for the breached
hospital-year observations. The 30-day AMI mortality rate is decreasing, but the flat trend
around the year of the breach suggests a change in slope associated with the breach.
In figure 3, never-breached hospitals were assigned to a randomly selected breach year, then
each hospital-year observation was assigned a pseudo-relative time. The mean 30-day AMI
mortality rate of the breached and non-breached hospital-year observations were plotted on
the same relative-time x-axis. The breached and non-breached followed a similar decreasing
trend, except for the higher mortality rate among the breached hospital-year observations
during the first and second years after a breach.
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Figure 3: Relative time from breach(n=0) vs mean 30-day AMI mortality rate with never-
breached hospitals assigned to a randomly selected breach year
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Table 1: Count of reported breaches by type 2011-2015
Breach Type N %
Hacking IT Incident 23 8.7%
Improper Disposal 4 1.5%
Loss 73 27.7%
Multiple Types 3 1.1%
Other 13 4.9%
Theft 62 23.5%
Unauthorized Access Disclosure 86 32.6%
Sum 264 100%
Table 2: Sum of individuals affected by breach type 2011-
2015
Breach Type N Individuals Affected
Hacking IT Incident 12 4,922,533
Improper Disposal 4 3,192
Loss 18 86,070
Multiple Types 3 49,644
Other 10 88,293
Theft 62 354,719
16
Breach Type N Individuals Affected
Unauthorized Access Disclosure 39 351,642
Sum 148 5,856,093
Table 1 shows the hospital-year counts by breach type. A total of 264 hospital-years were
breached. The three most common breach types were unauthorized access (86), loss (73),
and theft (62). A subset of breached observations reported the number of individual records
affected by the breach. While this measure is prone to error and underreporting, it is a
proxy for the severity of a breach. Table 2 shows the sum of individuals affected by breach
type. 148 hospital-years reported the number of individuals affected by breaches, summing
to approximately 5,856,093 individual records. Between 2011-2015, 12 hacking IT incidents
affected approximately 4,922,533 individuals.
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Table 3: Hospital-year characteristics
never breached pre-breach post-breach
n 10511 366 691
30-day mortality rate AMI, mean (sd) 15.1 (1.5) 15.2 (1.7) 14.7 (1.6)
Operating revenue, mean (sd), $mn 241.7 (254.6) 574.7 (527.8) 686.0 (659.5)
Number of beds, mean (sd) 250.4 (183.8) 469.7 (321.7) 515.6 (420.2)
Length of stay, mean (sd) 4.4 (0.8) 4.9 (0.9) 4.9 (0.9)
Bed occupancy rate, mean (sd) 56.5 (16.6) 68.4 (15.0) 67.4 (14.5)
Meaningful user this year, n (%): yes 6727 (64.0) 150 (41.0) 524 (75.8)
Ownership, mean (sd):
Non-profit 6876 (65.4) 237 (64.8) 472 (68.3)
Profit 2395 (22.8) 22 ( 6.0) 76 (11.0)
Public 1240 (11.8) 107 (29.2) 143 (20.7)
Teaching status, n (%):
Major teaching 921 ( 8.8) 148 (40.4) 266 (38.5)
Minor teaching 2838 (27.0) 107 (29.2) 219 (31.7)
Non-teaching 6752 (64.2) 111 (30.3) 206 (29.8)
Year, n (%):
2011 2175 (20.7) 159 (43.4) 57 ( 8.2)
2012 2186 (20.8) 116 (31.7) 100 (14.5)
2013 2125 (20.2) 62 (16.9) 150 (21.7)
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never breached pre-breach post-breach
2014 2073 (19.7) 29 ( 7.9) 181 (26.2)
2015 1952 (18.6) 0 ( 0.0) 203 (29.4)
Percent definitely not recommend, mean (sd) 5.5 (3.0) 5.6 (3.1) 5.1 (2.7)
Percent probably recommend, mean (sd) 25.0 (6.6) 24.2 (7.0) 22.4 (6.2)
Percent definitely recommend, mean (sd) 69.5 (8.7) 70.2 (9.4) 72.5 (8.2)
Percent patient rating <= 6, mean (sd) 8.9 (3.8) 9.7 (4.3) 8.5 (3.3)
Percent patient rating 7-8, mean (sd) 23.3 (4.6) 24.0 (5.1) 22.1 (4.4)
Percent patient rating 9-10, mean (sd) 67.8 (7.6) 66.3 (8.6) 69.4 (7.1)
Individuals affected by breach, mean (sd) . . 39568 (370823)
PSI-90 composite, mean (sd) 0.7 (0.2) 0.8 (0.3) 0.8 (0.3)
PSI-4 surgical complication, mean (sd) 114.9 (18.7) 113.8 (19.2) 118.4 (20.6)
PSI-6 iatrogenic pneumothorax, mean (sd) 0.4 (0.1) 0.4 (0.1) 0.4 (0.1)
PSI-12 pulmonary embolism, mean (sd) 4.2 (1.8) 5.1 (2.5) 4.9 (2.1)
PSI-15 accidental laceration, mean (sd) 1.9 (0.7) 2.0 (0.8) 2.0 (0.8)
Characteristics of the hospital-year observations by breach status are summarized in Table
3. The timing of breaches varied. Among the breached hospitals, most of the pre-breach
hospital-year observations came from years 2011-2013 while most post-breach observations
came from years 2013-2015. Because of variability in breach event timing, it was impossible
to assign the hospitals that were never breached into a pre- or post-event category based
on time. Therefore, the never-breached hospital-year observations were pooled into a single
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control group. This is a limitation to the comparability of the time-varying characteristics
between the never-breached group and the pre-breach group in Table 3.
The control group and the pre-breach group had similar distributions for the 30-day AMI
mortality rate. The mean 30-day AMI mortality rate for the pre-breach group was 15.2%; for
the control group it was 15.1%.
The mean number of beds for the pre-breach group was nearly two times larger than the
control group (469.7 versus 250.4). Among the breached group, the number of beds was
higher in the post-breach group.
The proportion of hospital-year observations that reported being a meaningful user of
electronic health records (HITECH) for that year varied across the control (64.0%), pre-
(41.0%), and post-breach (75.8%) groups. The variation was due to the differences in the
distribution of observations by year for each group. Cross-tabulating the percentage of
meaningful users by group and year showed that the overall percentage grew from 13% in
2011 to 94% by 2014, and that each group followed a similar time trend.
The proportions of not-for-profit hospitals were similar between the control group and the
breached group. However, the breached group had a higher proportion of public hospitals,
while the control group had a higher proportion of for-profit hospitals. The breached group
was more likely to be major teaching hospitals. Patient satisfaction measures were similar
between the control group and the breached group, and satisfaction within the breached
group did not vary between the pre- and post-breach group.
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4.2 Estimates
Multivariate regression estimates indicate that a data breach was associated with a 0.338[95%
CI, 0.101-0.576] percentage point increase in the 30-day AMI mortality rate one year after
the breach, 0.446[95% CI, 0.164-0.729] percentage point increase two years after the breach,
and 0.363[95% CI, 0.0174-0.709] percentage point increase three years after the breach (Table
4). 30-day AMI mortality rate of breached hospitals did not differ significantly from the
never-breached hospitals in the pre-breach periods.
Table 4: Multivariate model of 30-day AMI mortality rate
and hospital data breach
Variable Coefficient Estimate 95% CI
Relative time (ref= -1)
-4 -0.126 [-0.602,0.351]
-3 0.0207 [-0.291,0.333]
-2 -0.0931 [-0.298,0.111]
0 0.0846 [-0.101,0.270]
1 0.338** [0.101,0.576]
2 0.446** [0.164,0.729]
3 0.363* [0.0174,0.709]
4 0.213 [-0.237,0.664]
operating revenue 1.54e-10 [-6.67e-11,3.75e-10]
number of beds 0.000133 [-0.000263,0.000528]
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Variable Coefficient Estimate 95% CI
length of stay 0.0470 [-0.0284,0.122]
bed occupancy rate 0.178 [-0.304,0.660]
meaningful user (ref=no)
yes 0.000662 [-0.0653,0.0666]
definitely not recommend hospital 0.00805 [-0.00936,0.0255]
year (ref=2011)
2012 -0.323*** [-0.373,-0.272]
2013 -0.616*** [-0.692,-0.539]
2014 -0.916*** [-1.009,-0.823]
2015 -1.575*** [-1.667,-1.482]
Constant 15.29*** [14.87,15.72]
N 11568
N group 2619
95% confidence intervals in brackets
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Estimation results that are shown in Table 4 are plotted in Figure 3. The y-intercept is the
expected 30-day AMI mortality rate at one year before the breach. It is the baseline 30-day
AMI mortality if a breach had not occurred, and for ease of interpretation, we centered
it at zero instead of the grand mean. The plotted points are the expected 30-day AMI
mortality rate at the relative breach time, adjusting for the baseline rate, yearly time trends,
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time-invariant hospital effects, and time-varying hospital characteristics. At 1, 2, 3, years
after the breach, the 30-day AMI mortality rate point estimates are significantly higher than
the baseline.
Figure 4: Estimated association between breach and 30 day mortality rate for AMI
We tested whether the association between data breaches and the 30-day AMI mortality rate
was stronger for more serious breaches. Breached hospitals were categorized into two groups:
above or below the median number of breached individual records. From the reference model,
the pre-breach and post-breach indicators were interacted with an indicator for the magnitude
of breach. The estimation results are plotted in Figure 4. The association between data
breaches and AMI mortality rate did not differ significantly by the magnitude of the breach.
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Figure 5: Estimated association between breach and 30 day mortality rate for AMI by severity
of breach
24
In another test for moderating factors, the pre- post-breach indicators were interacted with
the type of breach. External breaches included hacking, theft; internal breaches included
improper disposal, loss, and unauthorized disclosure. The relation between breaches and
AMI mortality did not differ significantly by the type of breach (Figure 5).
Figure 6: Estimated association between breach and 30 day mortality rate for AMI by type
of breach
4.3 Robustness Tests
Care quality problems that involve provider error or negligence may be correlated with both
data breaches and patient mortality. Patient safety indicators were added to the reference
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model to control for care quality. Patient safety indicators were only available for a subset of
observations. Patient safety indicators PSI-4, PSI-6, PSI-12, PSI-15 were available from 2012
(7,096 observations). PSI-90 composite index was available from 2013 (5,227 observations).
The following alternative models were estimated: (1) reference model estimated with the
subset, (2) model estimated with PSI-90 composite index, and (3) model estimated with
PSI-4, PSI-6, PSI-12, and PSI-15. Including the patient safety indicators did not change the
results from the reference model. We conclude that our model findings are robust to hospital
differences in overall care quality.
5 Discussion
We find that hospital data breaches were associated with higher 30-day AMI mortality rates
in the years following the breach. Figure 1 shows that improvements in AMI treatment have
resulted in the 30-day AMI mortality rate decreasing about 0.4 percentage points annually
since 2011. The .34 to.45 percentage point increase in 30-day AMI mortality rate after a
breach was comparable to undoing a year’s worth of improvement in mortality rate. The
national estimate for the number of hospital discharges for AMI has fluctuated around 556,000
discharges annually between 2005 and 2014.[31] On average, a data breach at a non-federal
acute-care inpatient hospital was associated with an additional 34 to 45 deaths per 1000 AMI
discharges per year.
Changes in HIT and patient care processes in response to a data breach introduce usability
challenges and unintended side effects that frustrate clinicians and disrupt patient care.[32]
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Frustrated clinicians bypassing the new system and process with ad hoc workarounds creates
new opportunities for errors.[33,34] Enhanced security measures in response to a data breach
are likely to worsen the usability of the HIT system, which would not only diminish the
effectiveness of its intended function but also spawn new errors that worsen the quality of
care provided to patients.
We observed that the elevated mortality rates persisted for three years subsequent to a breach.
We believe that the impact of a breach is likely shorter than three years as hospitals tend to
implement new procedures, processes, and technologies in the first year following a breach.
Thus we expect the impact of the breach would dissipate over time – possibly less than two
years. We note that the data generating process for mortality rates may contribute to the
three-year observed impact. Hospital Compare Data measure 30-day mortality as a 36-month
moving average, which would smooth the observed response to a breach. The higher mortality
rate at three years after the breach suggests this smoothing may be extending the observed
time-impact.
More recently, the emergence of hospital ransomware attacks have disrupted hospital services
and there are growing fears of attacks on the care delivery system itself.[35] Ransomware
attacks are considered to be more disruptive to hospital operations than the breaches
considered in this study. The data breaches studied in our analysis come from 2011-2015
when such ransomware or infrastructure attacks were rare. If disruption to information
technology used by providers is driving the breach effect, the findings from our study suggest
that ransomware attacks may have an even stronger negative impact on patients than the
breaches studied in this paper.
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Time varying care quality problems are potential confounders to estimating the breach impact
on patient outcomes. Controlling for patient safety indicators attempted to address this
concern. The breach impact estimates were similar between the models with and without
the patient safety indicators. The findings suggest that patient safety indicators were not
confounding factors, but raises new concerns whether these indicators were effective controls
for care quality problems.
Health data breaches have significant consequences for patients, providers, and payers, which
could be framed as a quality of care problem. Protecting health information should be an
important responsibility of all parties in the healthcare industry. Our results indicate that
breaches and the subsequent hospital reaction may adversely impact care quality. We suggest
that breached hospitals should carefully consider subsequent security initiatives to reduce
the potential impact of new processes, procedures, and technologies on care quality. The
healthcare community must work together to jointly address the need to protect patient data
and improve patient outcomes.
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